UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/436
15 June 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, Mr. Rolf Ekéus, has informed the Security Council that on 14 June 1996 Iraqi air defence positions aimed at a Special Commission helicopter flying in the Abu Ghraib area. Accordingly, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, gave instructions for an immediate inquiry into the alleged incident.

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the findings of that inquiry, and I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-14999 (E) 170696 170696 180696

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Annex

Findings of the inquiry into the alleged incident of 14 June 1996

1. At 0800 hours on 14 June 1996 a United Nations helicopter escorted by an Iraqi helicopter took off from Rashid airbase to carry out a reconnaissance mission over an unknown objective within an 80-by-65-kilometre area. Those on board the United Nations helicopter were accompanied by three Iraqis, including an Iraqi pilot, and they included the Australian leader of the UNSCOM Aerial Inspection Team.

2. At 0817 hours the helicopters arrived at a point close to the West Baghdad expressway intersection and the Iraqi representative in the UNSCOM helicopter was given the coordinates of the intended objective. It turned out to be a Republican Guard base, and the team leader was informed that this was a sensitive site of which overflights were not permitted. The team leader acceded to this and gave the coordinates of the second objective. It turned out to be a presidential site. He was informed of this also, and it was decided to return to Rashid airfield. The helicopters landed there at 0940 hours.

3. At 0945 hours Chief Inspector Smidovich of the UNSCOM 150 inspection team contacted Brigadier-General Husam Muhammad Amin, Director of the National Monitoring Directorate, and informed him that anti-aircraft guns in the area had been aimed at their helicopter. When inquiries were made with the party concerned it became clear that this allegation was untrue, and he was informed accordingly at 1000 hours.

4. At 1100 hours Chief Inspector Smidovich asked Brigadier-General Husam Muhammad Amin to be allowed to fly over the old Abu Ghraib road (to observe the Republican Guard base) and to fly from there over a Republican Guard self-propelled field artillery detachment. Agreement to this was obtained subject to discussion of details of the flight over the two locations in question between the Iraqi officer concerned on the one hand and the leader of the Aerial Inspection Team and the commander of the German airmen on the other. The new flight plan was then drawn up and takeoff was at 1200 hours.

5. At 1220 hours the United Nations helicopter escorted by an Iraqi helicopter arrived over the second objective (a Republican Guard self-propelled field artillery detachment) and proceeded to circle the objective for a period of two and a half hours. It then returned to Rashid airbase.

6. During the long time the overflight lasted, neither the leader of the Aerial Inspection Team nor the commander of the airmen made any remark with regard to any alleged movement by the guns, and both parties were surprised by the allegation after the helicopter landed at Rashid airbase.

7. All anti-aircraft weapons were secured by those concerned some minutes before the helicopters took off and remained secured until they landed back at the base, in accordance with the procedures followed in order to ensure the safety of aircraft and those on board.

8. While the helicopter was flying over the objective at 1400 hours, Chief Inspector Smidovich contacted Brigadier-General Husam Muhammad Amin and informed him that soldiers had taken up position at a number of anti-aircraft guns and had turned the guns in the direction of the United Nations helicopter. When inquiries were made with the party concerned, it became clear that this allegation was untrue. It transpired that a number of soldiers had manned positions near their guns on sighting the helicopter, which is a normal procedure and was not intended to pose a threat to the United Nations helicopter or to affect its mission. The situation is that the alleged incident was reported by an inspector who was close to the artillery position near the Republican Guard base and communicated these allegations to the Chief Inspector by radio. It appears that Chief Inspector Smidovich understood that the artillery position was close to the helicopter, while the helicopter did not pass over air defence weapons.

9. At 1407 hours the Chief Inspector of the UNSCOM 150 team was informed that these were air defence operating procedures and that there was no problem with your aircraft, particularly since there was an Iraqi helicopter accompanying it and Iraqi escorts on board. Brigadier-General Husam Muhammad Amin also made it clear to him that no guns were turned in the direction of the helicopter or in any other direction and that the Chief Inspector could verify that with the helicopter crew or the leader of the Aerial Inspection Team, who were in the helicopter and were those directly involved in the incident.

10. From the facts mentioned it is clear that the allegation made by the Executive Chairman to the Security Council and to the press was hasty and based on inaccurate information and that it has no foundation.

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S/1996/437
17 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you of the measures taken by the Government of the Czech Republic to implement the provisions of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996.

The Government of the Czech Republic has instructed all Cabinet members to minimize contacts and invitations as regards members of the Government of the Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces. The Government of the Czech Republic has also taken the necessary measures to minimize the granting of visas to the members of the Government of the Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces.

I note that while our two countries have diplomatic relations, they do not maintain diplomatic missions in each other's capitals.

I should be grateful if you would have this note circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Karel KOVANDA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-15085 (E) 170696 180696

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/438
17 June 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that at 1130 hours on 23 May 1996 Iraqi coastal craft on patrol in the Khawr Abd Allah sighted a group of Kuwaiti fishing boats inside our territorial waters. When our patrol approached them in order to move them outside our territorial waters, the boats opened fire on the patrol and took off in the direction of Khawr al-Sabiyah. Similarly, at 1115 hours on 25 May 1996 a group of Kuwaiti fishing boats was seen inside our territorial waters. These boats also opened fire on our patrol boats before fleeing outside our territorial waters.

I request you to intervene, as is required of you in accordance with the responsibilities entrusted to you under the Charter of the United Nations, in order to prevent any repetition of these provocative and unwarranted actions on the part of Kuwait and to see to it that Kuwait is held liable for the consequences of acts that escalate tension in the immediate area and adversely affect security and stability in the region as a whole.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-15091 (E) 170696 170696 180696

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/439
17 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 13 June 1996 from Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, addressed to you on the latest developments in Tajikistan.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-15103 (E) 170696 180696

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Annex

Letter dated 13 June 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General

The holding of several rounds of inter-Tajik talks and the agreements thus reached as a result of the support and efforts of the United Nations and observer countries presented a ray of hope to the afflicted people of Tajikistan during the last few months for establishment of a just and durable peace and prevalence of stability. However, the recent events and developments at borders and within Tajikistan have renewed reasons for concern on the part of the supporters and promoters of peace and tranquillity in that country.

The Tehran Cease-fire Agreement of 17 September 1994, which resulted from negotiations between the two sides and efforts of the United Nations and other intermediaries, presenting an appropriate and necessary basis for the peaceful settlement of the crisis through constructive talks between the two sides, has been reportedly violated by both sides on several occasions. In the meantime, no effective measure has been taken to promote and carry out those understandings that have not to date been breached, and, as a result, the Joint Commission for monitoring the cease-fire has been rendered inactive.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has the strong conviction that during the transitional period the region is in dire need of calm and stability, and that the continuation of the current crisis in Tajikistan would adversely affect all of central Asia. Hence, the Islamic Republic of Iran views the recent events in Tajikistan with deep concern. It is in this context that, in keeping with its policy to help settle regional crises, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the intermediary countries working with the United Nations to restore peace and stability in Tajikistan, underscores that commitment to continuation of inter-Tajik talks and full adherence to agreements and understandings thus reached by both sides is the only viable solution for the crisis. Therefore, I feel compelled to draw your attention to the urgent need to hold the inter-Tajik talks in the shortest possible time and to the imperative of adopting measures to build confidence.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as in the past, expresses its readiness to help and cooperate with the United Nations and your Special Representative in Tajikistan for the fulfilment of the serious and constructive task of settling the dispute and the convening of a new round of inter-Tajik talks.

(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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GENERAL

S/1996/440
17 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 12 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations has the honour to enclose herewith a communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia dated 6 June 1996, concerning implementation of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996) (see annex).

96-15189 (E) 180696 190696

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Annex

Communication dated 6 June 1996 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia addressed to the Secretary-General

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has the honour to refer to the note of the Secretary-General dated 15 May 1996 (SCA/2/96(10-1)), by which he requested information on the measures taken by the Government of Ethiopia in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5 of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996).

In this regard the Ministry wishes to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of Ethiopia had already taken measures prior to resolution 1054 (1996), which fully concur with the above-mentioned paragraphs. Accordingly, as at 1 September 1995:

(a) The number of diplomats working at the Sudanese Embassy in Addis Ababa were limited to four, including the Ambassador, while the remaining left Ethiopia after a seven-day notice. The movement of the remaining diplomats is monitored closely. Similarly, the Government of Ethiopia has limited the number of its diplomats in Khartoum to the same level;

(b) The Consulate of the Sudan in Gambella (Western Ethiopia) has been closed;

(c) All Sudanese nationals are now required to obtain a visa to enter Ethiopia and the exemption of the visa requirement previously issued by the Government of Ethiopia to neighbouring countries will not apply to Sudanese nationals;

(d) All institutions and non-governmental organizations, directly or indirectly related with the Sudan, operating under the guise of humanitarian activities were made to cease immediately all their activities in Ethiopia, and Sudanese nationals and other expatriates working in those organizations have left the country;

(e) Sudan Airways is prohibited from entering Ethiopia and Sudanese national employees of the carrier's office in Addis Ababa have left the country. Similarly, Ethiopian Airlines has ceased its flight to Khartoum;

(f) The Sudanese Community School in Addis Ababa has been closed and all its teachers of Sudanese nationality and other expatriates working at the school have left Ethiopia within seven days;

(g) The Sudan News Agency (SUNA) office in Addis Ababa has been closed and Sudanese nationals working in the Agency's office have left Ethiopia within seven days.

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S/1996/441
17 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRAZIL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

With reference to Security Council resolution 1054 (1996), which determines the implementation of diplomatic sanctions against the Government of the Sudan, I have the honour to inform you that Brazil and the Sudan have no diplomatic missions or consular posts in their respective territories. Furthermore, the Brazilian authorities are taking all adequate measures regarding the entry into and transit through the territory of Brazil of those Sudanese nationals included in the provisions set forth in paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution.

(Signed) Celso L. N. AMORIM
Permanent Representative of Brazil
to the United Nations

96-15195 (E) 180696 190696

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Security Council

Distr.
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S/1996/442
17 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I again have the honour to refer to resolution 1021 (1995), which was adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1995 concerning the embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment imposed by resolution 713 (1991).

With my letter of 13 June 1996 (S/1996/433), I conveyed to you a communication dated 11 June 1996 which I had received from the Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and which described progress achieved in implementing article II of annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement. In that letter I undertook to convey to the Security Council any further relevant information that would be received from the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE.

I now have the honour to forward the attached letter dated 14 June 1996 and a further letter and enclosure dated 17 June 1996 which I have received from the Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE.

I should be grateful if you could bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-15123 (E) 170696 180696

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Annex I

[Original: French]

Letter dated 14 June 1996 from the Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, according to our delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an agreement on the limitation of armaments in keeping with article IV of annex 1-B to the Dayton Agreement has been reached today at Florence, Italy.

This new agreement is to be signed on Monday at Oslo and will enter into force immediately thereafter.

The Chairman-in-Office is expecting the early submission of a report from Norwegian Ambassador Eide, which will then be transmitted to the Secretariat.

(Signed) Johannes J. MANZ
Ambassador
Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office

Annex II

[Original: French]

Letter dated 17 June 1996 from the Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to my letter of 14 June I have the honour to draw your attention to the report drafted by Norwegian Ambassador V. Eide on the agreement on the limitation of armaments pursuant to article IV of annex 1-B to the Dayton Agreement concluded on 14 June at Florence, Italy.

(Signed) Johannes J. MANZ
Ambassador
Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office

Enclosure

Progress report on the implementation of article IV of annex 1-B of the Dayton Accord

TO: Ambassador von Tscharner

FROM: Ambassador Vig. Fide

SUBJECT: Status of Article IV Negotiations

The Parties to the Article IV Negotiations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, on 14 June signed an Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control at the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Florence. The Parties used the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty) as a starting point, which can be seen in many of the provisions of the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control.

As called for in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the "Dayton Agreement"), the Parties agreed to set limits on five categories of armaments -- battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery from 75 mm caliber and above, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. These limits, based generally on the formula identified in the Dayton Agreement, limit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to approximately 75% of its current holdings while Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are each limited to approximately 30% of the current Yugoslav holdings. (Of the latter, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will have limits of 2/3 the total in each category of armaments, with the Republika Srpska's limits being the remaining 1/3 of the total.)

The Parties agreed to an extensive information exchange and intrusive on-site inspection regime to verify compliance with the Agreement. The Parties will exchange information on their holdings of armaments limited by the Agreement on 21 June, with information effective as of 1 July 1996 the start of a four-month baseline validation period.

As with the CFE Treaty, the Agreement contains specific provisions addressing the methods to be used to reduce armaments. The Agreement specifies a 12-month reduction period, and further identifies two reduction phases. At the end of the first phase, 1 January 1997, those Parties with reduction liabilities must have reduced at least 40% of their reduction liability for combat aircraft, attack helicopters and artillery, and 20% of their reduction liability for battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles.

Another significant aspect of the Agreement is that it establishes the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission to act as an implementation review body. Chairmanship of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission will rotate among the Parties, however the Parties have agreed that the Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office of the OSCE will chair meetings of the Sub-Regional Commission during 1996.

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The Agreement entered into force upon signature on 14 June, so the Parties have already begun organizational steps required for implementation. The first concrete demonstration of implementation will be 21 June, at the first meeting of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission, during which the Parties will exchange information on their holdings of armaments limited by the Agreement. On 21 June, the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission will also review the initial implementation schedule, to ensure the Parties have no questions concerning required activities.

In addition, the OSCE participating States have been asked to identify personnel who might be able to assist the Parties in execution of the inspection regime. Under the terms of the Agreement, and with the concurrence of the Parties, up to three assistants may be designated to accompany inspection and escort teams during the conduct of these inspections. The Personal Representative will compile the list of names provided by OSCE States and submit it to the Parties for their use.

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18 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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I should be grateful if you could bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

* Reissued for technical reasons.

96-15207 (E) 180696 190696

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Annex I

[Original: French]

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The Chairman-in-Office is expecting the early submission of a report from Norwegian Ambassador Eide, which will then be transmitted to the Secretariat.

(Signed) Johannes J. MANZ
Ambassador
Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office

Annex II

[Original: French]

Letter dated 17 June 1996 from the Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe addressed to the Secretary-General

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(Signed) Johannes J. MANZ
Ambassador
Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office

Enclosure

To: Ambassador von Tscharner

From: Ambassador Vig. Eide

Subject: Status of Article IV Negotiations

The Parties to the Article IV Negotiations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, on 14 June signed an Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control at the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Florence. The Parties used the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty) as a starting-point, which can be seen in many of the provisions of the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control.

As called for in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the "Dayton Agreement"), the Parties agreed to set limits on five categories of armaments - battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery from 75 mm calibre and above, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Those limits, based generally on the formula identified in the Dayton Agreement, limit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to approximately 75 per cent of its current holdings while Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are each limited to approximately 30 per cent of the current Yugoslav holdings. (Of the latter, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will have limits of 2/3 the total in each category of armaments, with the Republika Srpska's limits being the remaining 1/3 of the total.)

The Parties agreed to an extensive information exchange and intrusive on-site inspection regime to verify compliance with the Agreement. The Parties will exchange information on their holdings of armaments limited by the Agreement on 21 June, with information effective as of 1 July 1996, the start of a four-month baseline validation period.

As with the CFE Treaty, the Agreement contains specific provisions addressing the methods to be used to reduce armaments. The Agreement specifies a 12-month reduction period, and further identifies two reduction phases. At the end of the first phase, 1 January 1997, those Parties with reduction liabilities must have reduced at least 40 per cent of their reduction liability for combat aircraft, attack helicopters and artillery, and 20 per cent of their reduction liability for battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles.

Another significant aspect of the Agreement is that it establishes the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission to act as an implementation review body. Chairmanship of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission will rotate among the Parties, however the Parties have agreed that the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE will chair meetings of the Sub-Regional Commission during 1996.

The Agreement entered into force upon signature on 14 June, so the Parties have already begun organizational steps required for implementation. The first concrete demonstration of implementation will be 21 June, at the first meeting of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission, during which the Parties will exchange information on their holdings of armaments limited by the Agreement. On 21 June, the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission will also review the initial implementation schedule, to ensure the Parties have no questions concerning required activities.

In addition, the OSCE participating States have been asked to identify personnel who might be able to assist the Parties in execution of the inspection regime. Under the terms of the Agreement and with the concurrence of the Parties, up to three assistants may be designated to accompany inspection and escort teams during the conduct of these inspections. The Personal Representative will compile the list of names provided by OSCE States and submit it to the Parties for their use.

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General Assembly
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A/50/975
S/1996/443
18 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 17 June 1996 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 17 June 1996, addressed to you by Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex, which contains a letter sent to you by Mr. Atay A. Raşit, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, could be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tuluy TANÇ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

Letter dated 17 June 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter dated 17 June 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Atay A. Raşit, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in connection with the recent visit to United Nations Headquarters of Mr. Alecos Michaelides, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, and the remarks he made on the question of Cyprus at an informal meeting of the Security Council on 14 June 1996.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX

Letter dated 17 June 1996 from Mr. Atay A. Ragit addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the recent visit to United Nations Headquarters in New York of Mr. Alecos Michaelides, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, who was given an opportunity to speak at an informal meeting of the Security Council on the question of Cyprus on 14 June 1996.

At the outset, I wish to point out that, for reasons which are well known to all and need not be repeated here, neither Mr. Michaelides nor any member of the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus has the right or authority to represent Cyprus as a whole at the United Nations or anywhere else. Anything he says or does, therefore, is not valid or binding on the Turkish Cypriot side, which is represented by its own democratically elected representatives.

At a time when the question of the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is under consideration by the Security Council and the Secretary-General is expected to present a report on his mission of good offices soon, this visit by Mr. Michaelides, and that of his leader, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, is no doubt aimed at influencing international public opinion in their favour by propagating the Greek Cypriot side's own point of view. It is regrettable, however, that the Turkish Cypriot side, as one of the two directly interested parties to the Cyprus dispute, has not been given a similar opportunity to present its views to the Council members. This is not only against the principle of the political equality of the two sides in Cyprus, envisaged in the relevant Security Council resolutions, and the principle of "equal footing" on which the United Nations-sponsored negotiating process is conducted, but also basic norms of justice.

I am, therefore, addressing this communication to you in the hope that the views presented below will go some way in redressing the utterly imbalanced and unfair situation created by these developments, particularly Mr. Michaelides' one-sided presentation of the issue to the members of the Security Council.

At that meeting, Mr. Michaelides repeated his side's well-known rhetoric of "invasion and occupation" of Cyprus. This unfounded assertion ignores not only the historical facts but also the present realities in the island. Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974, in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, only after the military junta in Greece and its proxies in Cyprus had launched the final attempt to annex the island to Greece (enosis). Before then, the Greek-Greek Cypriot duo had been agitating for enosis for 11 years, causing untold bloodshed and suffering to the Turkish Cypriot population in a severe campaign of ethnic cleansing. The coup d'état was the final episode in this reign of terror and violence, and even Archbishop Makarios, the then leader of the Greek Cypriot community, had called it "an invasion of the island by Greece" from the result of which "the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and the Turks". It is ironic that Makarios' words, as part of his speech on 19 July 1974, were spoken in the very building in which Mr. Michaelides unabashedly accused Turkey of invading Cyprus.

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Having thus wrongly identified the source of the Cyprus conflict, it was inevitable for Mr. Michaelides to advance the wrong conclusions. His attempt to shift the responsibility for the present deadlock in the negotiations on the Turkish Cypriot side is not borne out by facts. It is useful to recall that, in the long history of the negotiating process, the Turkish Cypriot side has accepted two "draft framework agreements" presented by the United Nations in 1985 and 1986, respectively; 91 out of 100 paragraphs of the United Nations-sponsored "set of ideas" presented in 1992; and the package of confidence-building measures prepared by the United Nations in 1993/94. The Greek Cypriot side has rejected all of the above and refuses to sit at the table with us within the framework of the above parameters and the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, concluded between the leaders of the two communities under United Nations auspices, on the flimsy excuse that "there is no common ground".

The report from which Mr. Michaelides is said to have quoted at the meeting (S/1994/629 of 30 May 1994), purportedly as evidence of Turkish Cypriot "intransigence", was in fact complemented by a subsequent letter by the Secretary-General, which corrects that assessment and any mistaken impression in that regard (see the letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 28 June 1994).

In a more recent demonstration of the Greek Cypriot side's lack of political will to settle the Cyprus issue on a just and lasting basis, Mr. Clerides, contrary to the calculated impression that he had created before, rejected a written proposal by President Rauf Denktaş comprising, inter alia, the Turkish Cypriot side's support for the European Union membership of a Federal Cyprus in return for respect, by the Greek Cypriot side, for our sovereignty and political equality. In the same proposal, which was taken to Mr. Clerides by United States Presidential Emissary, Mr. Richard Beattie, during the latter's visit to the island in December 1995, we had also expressed our willingness to discuss, without prejudice to the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, the above issues and demilitarization. Unfortunately, this constructive proposal, like the previous ones, foundered on the utter rejection and intransigent stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership.

It is significant to note that, on the issues of membership in the European Union and "demilitarization", the Turkish Cypriot side has repeatedly made it known that it adheres to the relevant paragraphs of the set of ideas, which were carefully negotiated between the United Nations and the two parties, and which are among the parameters of a durable and just solution. It is the Greek Cypriot side which rejects the set of ideas by putting forward totally unrealistic demands, alien to the negotiating process, with the professed aim of doing away with the Treaty of Guarantee as well as other fundamental elements of a realistic solution, in a transparent attempt to bring about the ultimate Greek domination of Cyprus.

Similarly, the Greek Cypriot side is rejecting the signing of a non-aggression agreement between the two sides, repeatedly proposed by President Denktaş, and is blocking the extension of the "unmanning agreement" of 1989, which itself was proposed by President Denktaş in January 1995, both of which could help diffuse the tension along the buffer zone and prevent the recurrence of incidents such as the one which occurred on 3 June 1996 in

Nicosia. Since the facts on this unfortunate incident and our views on the Secretary-General's latest report to the Security Council on the activities of UNFICYP in general, have been, and will further be, communicated to the Council members, I will not go into these in detail. Suffice it to say that the Greek Cypriot side is exploiting what is basically a border incident, which could happen anywhere, by distorting and exploiting it for purely political purposes.

Mr. Michaelides' assertions to the effect that the demographic structure of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is being changed through the influx of people from mainland Turkey is both false and hypocritical. The record shows that it has always been the Greek Cypriot side trying to alter the demographic structure of the island for decades, not only by introducing tens of thousands of settlers from Greece, but also by its ethnic cleansing campaign against the Turkish Cypriots between 1963 and 1974. On the other hand, the introduction, in recent years, of tens of thousands of immigrants from third countries into Southern Cyprus, has drawn the reaction of even the international press, as it has turned Southern Cyprus into a centre for money-laundering, arms and drug smuggling and other illicit activity (see The New York Times of 15 June 1995, The Washington Times of 20 May and 20 June 1995, The Daily Mail of 15 August 1995, L'Express of 6 April 1995 and The Wall Street Journal of 6 May 1996).

As for the alleged emigration of Turkish Cypriots from Northern Cyprus, this is both an exaggeration and the epitome of hypocrisy on the part of the Greek Cypriot side, because the economic and other hardships being faced by the people of Northern Cyprus are the direct result of the inhuman economic, social, cultural and political embargo being imposed on our people by the usurper Greek Cypriot regime in Southern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side cannot profess conciliation on the one hand and try to strangulate the Turkish Cypriot people economically and politically on the other.

In the final analysis, Mr. Michaelides' remarks to the members of the Security Council are a testimony to his side's total loss of interest in the negotiating process and its lack of political will to settle the Cyprus issue through dialogue and negotiation. While this is not surprising in view of their unilateral drive to become a member of the European Union, without the Cyprus question being resolved, we hope that the international community will duly warn them about the inevitable consequences of this short-sighted policy, which runs the risk of dividing Cyprus permanently.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Atay A. RAŞİT
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Defence

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Item 71 of the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 13 June 1996 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement made on 1 June 1996 by President Clinton concerning the removal of all nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the statement as a document of the General Assembly, under item 71 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT

* A/51/50.

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ANNEX

Statement made by the President of the United States of America on 1 June 1996 concerning the removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine

Ukrainian President Kuchma has announced that all nuclear warheads have been removed from the territory of Ukraine. This is a remarkable achievement. In 1991, there were more than 4,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in Ukraine. Today there are none. I applaud the Ukrainian Government for its historic contribution in reducing the nuclear threat. When the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia and I signed the January 1994 Trilateral Statement on this issue, we looked forward to a day that has now arrived.

The trust and cooperation the United States and Ukraine have established in resolving this issue are a cornerstone of a broad and productive relationship. Ukraine has embarked on a bold course of political and economic reform, laying the foundations for democracy and a market economy. We remain committed to supporting Ukraine through its ambitious and far-sighted reforms and to working with Ukraine and our European partners to promote Ukraine's integration into the European community.

I also want to note the fact that both the United States and Russia are ahead of the reduction schedule provided for in the START I Treaty. To date, the United States has eliminated 750 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and about 800 strategic delivery vehicles in the former Soviet Union have been eliminated, including more than 700 in Russia. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Prog me has played a major role in the elimination of these weapons in the former Soviet Union and the denuclearization of Ukraine.

I have asked Secretary Perry to meet next week with his Ukrainian and Russian counterparts, Ministers Shmarov and Grachev, and mark the successful implementation of the Trilateral Statement by visiting a destroyed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo and a former nuclear weapons storage facility in Ukraine. In doing so, they will celebrate another important step in making the world safer for us all.

On this day of important milestones, I also welcome the agreement that was reached today in Vienna by the 30 nations party to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This agreement resolves a difficult problem that had arisen concerning the level of Russian and Ukrainian military equipment allowed on the northern and southern flank of the CFE region.

This agreement is the culmination of two years of negotiations led by the United States. I congratulate all parties, including our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, Russia, Ukraine and the States of the Caucasus and central and eastern Europe, for their hard work, cooperation and dedication to preserving the integrity and effectiveness of this crucial treaty.

The CFE Treaty is a key element of a new, more stable Europe. The treaty has resulted in the destruction of over 50,000 tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. It has also established a system of transparency measures, which will increase confidence through on-site inspections, notifications and information exchanges.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 18 June 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning repeated Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such attacks that took place in the second half of May 1996.

17 May 1996

At 1030 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

18 May 1996

Between 0400 and 0430 hours Israeli gunboats seized two fishing boats. On board the first boat were: Khalil Ali Dirmsis, 31; his brother Abbas Ali Dirmsis, 26; and Darwish Fadl Haju, 55. On board the other boat were: Husayn Ibrahim Amis, 31; and Ahmad Hasan Qazan, 27.

19 May 1996

An Israeli gunboat rammed and caused serious damage to the fishing boat Ilham II (No. 1337) off Qulaylah beach. The following were on board: Husayn Na'im Ghanim, 18; Hasan Tawfiq Ghanim, 17; and Hani Tawfiq Barnawi, 27.

At 0800 hours the outskirts of Kafr Tibnit came under Israeli artillery fire. This was accompanied by overflights of the area by Israeli helicopter gunships. Nawal Ali Basal, a 40-year-old Lebanese woman, was wounded in the shelling and taken to Ghandur hospital in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa.

20 May 1996

At 0930 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Iqlim al-Tuffah area.

At 2200 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Iqlim al-Tuffah area at low altitudes.

22 May 1996

At 1630 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Iqlim al-Tuffah area at low altitudes.

23 May 1996

At 1100 hours an artillery shell fired from one of the Israeli positions in the border strip fell on the outskirts of Suhmur.

25 May 1996

At 1400 hours the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills, the outskirts of Luwayzah and areas along the Nab' al-Tasah wadi came under Israeli artillery fire.

29 May 1996

At 0730 hours the outskirts of Frun, Ghanduriyah and Tulin came under Israeli artillery fire.

31 May 1996

At 0230 hours Israeli warplanes attacked Tallat al-Kayyal in Baalbek and bombed an ammunition dump belonging to Hizb Allah. They were met with ground-based anti-aircraft fire.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns these Israeli attacks, which have caused enormous damage to property. It further condemns in the strongest terms the arbitrary practices directed against civilians.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of international law and basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Permanent Representative